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Abstract
This article explores the economic conditions for the viability of organic farming in a
context of imperfect competition. While most research dealing with this issue has adopted
an empirical approach, we propose a theoretical foundation. Farmers have a choice between
two technologies, the conventional one using two complementary inputs, chemicals and seeds,
and the organic one only requiring organic seeds. The upstream markets are oligopolistic
and the rms adopt Cournot behavior. The game is solved backward. The equilibrium
repartition of the farmers between both sectors is obtained by a free entry condition.Since
multiple equilibria could exist, including the non emergence of organic farming, we spell
out viability conditions for organic farming. Then, using an "infant industry" argument,
we propose several public policy instruments able to support the development of organic
farming, and assess their relative e¢ ciency. Results could be usefull to asses the conditions
of emergence and viability of agricultural innovations in analogous contexts.
Keywords: agricultural inputs, organic farming, imperfect competition, technological choice,
free entry, policy design
JEL Classication: Q12 , L13
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1 Introduction
Organic agriculture is dened by the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements
(IFOAM) as "a production system that sustains the health of soils, ecosystems and people".
"It relies on ecological processes, biodiversity and cycles adapted to local condi-
tions, rather than the use of inputs with adverse e¤ects. Organic agriculture combines
tradition, innovation and science to benet the shared environment and promote fair
relationships and a good quality of life for all involved".
Thus, the ambition of organic farming is to accommodate agricultural production and the con-
sumersinterest, by limiting the impact of agriculture on the environment. While some experts
express doubt about the e¢ ciency of organic farming, several studies show sustained interest and
willingness of consumers to pay for organic products (Boccaletti and Nardella, 2000, Dimitri and
Richman, 2000, Batte et al., 2007). That paradox makes the study of the conditions of emergence
of organic farming a real challenge for research (Park and Lohr, 1996) . Most research dealing
with this subject adopts an empirical approach, and focus mainly on farmers and farms charac-
teristics ( Burton et al.,2003, Wheeler, 2008, Wynen and Edwards, 1990). Very little research has
been performed on the type of policy instruments able to enhance this emergence (Dimitri and
Oberholtzer, 2005, Eerola and Huhtala, 2008).
Of course, farms characteristics matter. Considering Kle¤er et al. (1977), Oude Lansink et
al. (2002), O¤erman and Nieberg (2000), Mayen et al. (2010), we must conclude that the organic
sector is less productive than the conventional one. As a consequence, the emergence of an organic
sector is only possible if the price of the organic products are not too close to the conventional one
and/or if there is some mechanism that compensates this productivity gap (Mayen et al., 2010).
This is why we incorporate two basic features that are often associated to organic farming: A
"learning-by-doing" process and the existence of a "niche market" for the corresponding products.
The rst feature is borrowed from Hanson et al. (1997), Martini et al. (2004) and Sipiläinen
and Oude Lansink (2005). It relies on the idea that the adoption of organic production requires
specic knowledge or at least some early experiments performed by innovators. Sipiläinen and
Oude Lansink (2005) estimate technical e¢ ciency of organic farming and its development over
time in Finnish dairy farms. They conclude that "the average e¢ ciency at rst decreases (when
the conversion towards organic farming starts) but at a decreasing rate, and turns then after 6-7
years to an increase" suggesting "learning e¤ects related to the experience in organic farming".
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It is well documented that some consumers are willing to pay more for organic food (Batte et
al., 2007, Krystallis and Chryssohoidis, 2005, Yiridoe et al., 2005, Boccaletti and Nardella, 2000,
Gil et al., 2000, ...). It is therefore quite obvious that organic farmers do not produce, say, for a
worldwide market but address more local markets in which they meet specic consumers with a
higher willingness to pay. But unfortunately, and contrary to the learning e¤ect, this additional
prot opportunity decreases with the number of organic farmers because the quantity supplied to
this "niche" market simply increases.
However, farming decisions are not only based on farm constraints and farmerspreferences
(Jaeck and Lifran, 2009) but rely also on the characteristics of the marketing channels in which the
farm is involved. That encompasses the set of relationships with both upstream and downstream
rms. This literature underlines the oligopolistic and oligopsonistic structure of industrial food
market, the implications in terms of price transmission along the marketing channel and the prot
capture realized by the upstream rms (see for instance McCorriston et al., 1998, Rogers and
Sexton, 1994, Saitone, Sexton and Sexton, 2008, Weldegebriel, 2004).
In this paper we focus on the behavior of upstream the input providers who are usually recog-
nized as acting as an oligopoly (Fulton and Giannakas, 2001, Hayenga, 1998). This peculiar market
structure is induced by the strategic behavior of upstream rms, and their interest in merging or
in vertical integration (Fulton and Giannakas, 2001, Johnson and Melkonyan, 2003, Shi, 2009).
Moreover, Just and Hueth (1993) show that the joint supply of complementary goods by a unique
rm will be larger than the one proposed when each of the two goods are supplied separately.
That arises because of the increasing cross marginal revenue.
This is why we assume that the agricultural inputs suppliers propose seeds and chemicals
simultaneously to all farmers. As a consequence, they have a great inuence on the adoption of
the technological package by the farmer. To be more precise, we present a model in which the two
agricultural inputs: seeds and chemicals, are complementary, and are jointly sold by upstream
rms. For the conventional sector, rms supply the two goods as a "bundle", as presented by Shi
and Chavas (2008), and Shi (2009), while, for the organic sector, they provide only specic seeds
without chemicals.
Given this particular context of imperfect competition, our paper attempts to characterize
the conditions of emergence and viability of organic farming. We propose a three step game.
In the rst step the farmers choose their mode of production by implementing either organic or
conventional farming. This choice is based on the comparison of the expected return of each
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technology and by the potential learning by doing e¤ect. Moreover, since there is free entry in
each sector, an equilibrium distribution is reached as soon as no farmer wants to change his mode
of production. The equilibrium that occurs at this stage provides some insights on the condition
of the emergence of organic farming. In the second step, the input providers choose the amount
of chemical-free seeds and quantity of the bundle of seeds and chemical they want to sell on these
two input markets. The transactions on this two markets result from a Cournot equilibrium in
which these downstream rms take into account the prot they can capture from both sectors.
Finally, in step three, farming takes place and the products are sold either on a "niche" market
for organic farmers or at the current worldwide price for conventional farming. Since we seek a
Nash equilibrium we solve this game backwards.
By solving this game, we also gain more insights on the conditions of the emergence and
the development of the new technology. This is why we also analyse the set of instruments
a policy maker would implement to boost the emergence of organic farming. Supporting for
organic farming emergence could arise from an argument that it is an "infant industry" to be
protected from rent capture by upstream oligopoly trough their power market. Competition
enhancing policy could also be invoked and social welfare enhancing arguments could legitimate
the support of "environnemental friendly technologies" (Eerola and Huhtala, 2008). However,
imperfect competition places specic constraints on the design of the instruments. We will assume
that the regulator cannot signicantly control the degree of competition among the upstream rms,
and that he will contemplate only "conventional" instruments : a tax on chemicals, subsidies to
organic seeds, subsidies to the production of organic products and actions to speed up the learning
process about the new technology.
As the imperfect competition context appears to be widespread in the agricultural sector, the
conclusions of our study about the emergence of organic farming could be relevant for all situations
where a new technology and the corresponding market compete with the conventional one.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the model, its assumptions and solve
the three step game. Section 3 is devoted to the study of quantity ows, i.e. the production of the
farmers and the equilibrium level of inputs, for a given distribution of the farmers between both
sectors. In section 4, we study the condition of the emergence of organic farming by studying the
properties of our free entry equilibrium. Section 5 addresses some public policy issues (subsidies
for organic farmers, taxes on chemicals etc.) and their role in easing or blocking the emergence
of organic farming. Section 6 contains concluding remarks. Proofs which are not central to the
argument are relegated to an appendix.
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2 The model
Consider an economy in which the agricultural sector is composed of two types of farmers. The rst
type, called conventional, produces a generic product dedicated to a large market. The second,
called organic, produces a specic chemical-free product and targets a niche market. Both buy
seeds or a bundle of seeds and chemicals from a small number m of upstream rms which exert
some market power. Within this structure, each farmer (within the total number N) will choose
either classical or organic farming. We denote by n the number of organic farmers.
Within the conventional sector, seeds and chemicals are complementary inputs. From that
point of view, we assume that the upstream rm typically sells, at price pb, a bundle in which
there is a xed proportion of chemicals to seeds. Hayenga (1998) presents a linked seed and
chemicals market, and concludes that the strategy of input providers is "to tie the seed customer
more closely to the chemical product". We also assume that the quantity of land is given, and
that the farmer allocates all his working time to the agricultural activity. He is not constrained by
water availability or others inputs. We can therefore reduce the production function to a unique
input: the amount of conventional seeds sc. We denote this function by f(sc) and assume as
usual that this function is increasing and exhibits decreasing return to scale, i.e. f 0(s) > 0 and
f"(s) < 0, satises the Inada conditions, i.e. lims!0 f 0(s) = +1; lims!+1 f 0(s) = 0 and does not
allow "free lunch", i.e. f(0) = 0. We also introduce two additional assumptions: the elasticity
ef 0(s) of f 0 remains bounded, the elasticity ef"(s) of f" is larger than  21.
We nally state that the output of the conventional sector is sold on a large, competitive
and perhaps worldwide market, at a given price pc. This simplifying assumption gives us the
opportunity to treat the conventional farmers as pure competitive players and to mainly focus on
the interaction with their suppliers.
The organic sector, by contrast, does not use chemicals and uses chemical-free seeds at price
ps. We again assume that the production function of this sector depends only on the amount
of seeds used so. This production function is quite the same as the one for the conventional
sector, in the sense that, without chemicals, the marginal productivity is reduced by some factor
 2 [0; 1], and is given by f(so). Consistent with Rouvière and Soubeyran (2011), the emergence
1In our vertical structure the demand of inputs is linked to the marginal productivity. These assumptions
therefore help to control the rst and the second order conditions of the optimization problem of the input providers.
These restrictions are typically met by any iso-elastic production function.
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of organic production is constrained by two balancing e¤ects, a "learning-by-doing" e¤ect, and a
"niche market" e¤ect".
The "learning-by-doing" e¤ect implies that the productivity gap between both sectors is de-
creasing with the number n of farmers who adopt organic production. In other word, we assume
that (n) is increasing with the number n of adoptors. Moreover it also seems quite reasonable to
assume that marginal contribution of a new entrant is decreasing with the number of participants
in the organic sector, and perhaps even disappears if all farmers choose organic farming. In other
words, we assume2 that 0(n) > 0, "(n) < 0 and limn!N 
0(n) = 0. We nevertheless maintain the
idea that (N) < 1: organic farming remains less productive than conventional farming. Thus,
this cannot justify the emergence of an organic agricultural sector per se.
The "niche market" e¤ect is related to the fact that some consumers are willing to pay more
for organic products. Since we essentially concentrate on the supply side we do not explicitly
model this behavior. We simply assume that the price p(n) at which farmers sell their organic
products depends on the number of adoptors and is, at least for the rst mover, attractive enough,
i.e. p(0) > pc. However, because we wish to capture the idea that we are on a "niche market", we
also assume that this potential advantage decreases with the number of farmers producing organic
products, and even at a increasing rate. For this reason, we require p0(n) < 0, p"(n) < 0 and that
limn!0 p0(n) = 0:
Following Fulton and Giannakas (2001) and Hayenga (1998), the upstream input providers,
indexed by j = 1; : : : ;m, are assumed to wield signicant market power on the input markets. We
distinguish two markets: one for organic seeds and one for bundles of seeds and chemical since
these two inputs enter in a xed proportion in the conventional production function. Each rm
delivers both inputs by taking as given the quantities provided by the other rms. We denote by
soj and s
c
j the the amount of organic seeds and of the bundle chosen by rm j.
We nally assume that these two goods are produced at a constant marginal cost, and we
denote by c0 and cb respectively for the organic seeds and the bundle of seeds and chemicals.
Moreover we assume that co < cb, which means that the production cost of organic seed is lower
than the production cost of a bundle composed of conventional seeds and chemicals. This gives,
of course, a competitive advantage to organic farming, but one has to keep in mind that these
input providers do not sell their product at the marginal cost : they try to capture a part of the
farmersprots.
2For simplicity, we consider n as a continuous variable.
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The timing of the game in this Cournot Oligopoly context is quite usual. As in a standard
entry model, farmers decide rst wether they want to produce organic products or develop a
conventional farming activity. Since entry is free, this choice is simply driven by the comparison
of the expected prots of moving from one sector to another. In the second step, the upstream
rms choose their optimal supply for both kind of seeds, having in mind that they deliver a bundle
of seeds and chemicals to the conventional farmers and anticipate the impact of their strategic
choice on the price of both products. In a third and nal step, the conventional, as well as the
organic farmers choose competitively the amount of organic seeds and the bundle of conventional
seeds and chemicals they want to use. We seeking a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game.
This allows us to identify the conditions inducing the existence of an organic farming sector, and
to design the public policy rules supporting the development of organic farming.
3 The equilibrium of the inputs sector
In this section, we take the distribution of the farmers between the two sectors as given and look
at the quantity of organic and conventional seeds that are traded. In other words, we focus on
the last two steps of the game. This gives us the opportunity to compute the prots realized by
each player and to prepare the discussion on the emergence of an organic production sector.
Let us rst begin with the competitive behavior of the two types of farmers. A standard prot
maximizing condition tells us that each farmer purchases seeds until his marginal productivity is
equal to the purchase price. Those conditions are written as:(
p(n)  ((n)  f 0(so)) = ps
pc  f 0(sc) = pb
(1)
respectively for organic and conventional farmers. Keeping in mind that all farmers are symmetric
within each sector, we immediately obtain the following inverse demand functions:
Ps (S0; k(n)) = k(n)  f 0

So
n

(2)
Pb (Sc; pc) = pc  f 0

Sc
N   n

(3)
where S0 and Sc stand for the aggregated demand for organic and conventional seeds and k(n) :=
p(n)  (n).
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In the Cournot game context, the input providers set their optimal supply of organic seeds sjo
and the bundle of conventional seeds and chemicals sjc in such a way to maximize their prots. In
other words, a Nash equilibrium of this game is given by: 8j = 1; : : : ;m
 
~sjo; ~s
j
c
 2 argmax
(sjo;sjc)
 
Ps
 
mX
j=1
sjo; k(n)
!
  co
!
 sjo +
 
Pb
 
mX
j=1
sjc; k(n)
!
  cb
!
 sjc (4)
This yields the following rst order conditions:
8j = 1; : : : ;m
8<: k(n)  f"

1
n
Pm
j=1 s
j
o

 sjo
n
+

k(n)  f 0

1
n
Pm
j=1 s
j
o

  co

= 0
pc  f"

1
N n
Pm
j=1 s
j
c

 sjc
N n +

pc  f 0

1
N n
Pm
j=1 s
j
c

  cb

= 0
(5)
Moreover, under the technical assumption (the elasticity ef"(s) of f" is larger than  2), these
conditions are necessary and su¢ cient for optimality (see appendix A).
If markets clear at a Cournot equilibrium and farmers are symmetric within each sector, we
can say that 1
n
Pm
j=1 s
j
o and
1
N n
Pm
j=1 s
j
c are, respectively, the amount of seed so and sc used by
an organic and a conventional farmer at the Cournot equilibrium. If we carry out this change
of notation, we immediately observe from equation (5) that the equilibrium production levels are
identical for each input provider and are given by:
8j = 1; : : : ;m  sjo; sjc =
 
n 
 
f 0 (so)  cok(n)
 f" (so)
!
; (N   n) 
 
f 0 (sc)  cbpc
 f" (sc)
!!
(6)
Summing up these quantities over all input providers and again making use of the previous market
clearing conditions, a Cournot equilibrium of the input providing game can be obtained by simply
solving for (so; sc) the following system:(
1
m
 f"(so)  so + f 0(so) = cok(n)
1
m
 f"(sc)  sc + f 0(sc) = cbpc
(7)
Under our assumptions, the conclusion follows:
Lemma 1 This system has a unique solution for (so; sc). Thus there exists a unique Cournot
equilibrium of the input provider game.
The previous Lemma is a rather technical (but necessary) result on the existence and unique-
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ness of a solution. It allows us to fully characterize the quantities that are traded and even to
construct the prot of the farmers and the input providers for any distribution of farmers between
the organic and the conventional sectors.
In fact, by equation (7), we know that the equilibrium demand for seeds of an organic and a
conventional farmer can be described by two functions, so

co
k(n)
;m

and sc

cb
pc
;m

; which relate
the quantity of seeds used in each sector to the number m of input provider and to the relative
protability of each sector measured by the ratio of the cost over the price (but taking into account
the learning-by-doing e¤ect). We can even observe:
Proposition 1 The equilibrium quantities of seeds in the organic sector, so

co
k(n)
;m

and in
the conventional one, sc

cb
pc
;m

used by a representative farmer are decreasing respectively with
the ratio co
k(n)
and cb
pc
, and increasing with the degree of competition measured by the number m of
input providers. Moreover as m!1; these quantities converge toward the competitive equilibrium
quantities given respectively by so

co
k(n)

= (f 0) 1

co
k(n)

and sc

cb
pc

= (f 0) 1

cb
pc

:
Recalling that each farmer behaves competitively by adjusting the marginal gain obtained from
the seeds to its price (see equation 1), we can easily compute the prot of each type of farmers.
These prot functions are given by:8<: o (k(n); co;m) = k(n) 
h
f (s)  f 0 (s)  sjso( cok(n) ;m)
i
= k(n)   (s)jso( cok(n) ;m)
c (pc; cb;m) = pc 
h
f (s)  f 0 (s)  sjsc( cbpc ;m)
i
= pc   (s)jsc( cbpc ;m)
(8)
We also observe that prots are non negative since for all neoclassical production functions f(s)
the marginal productivity is always lower than the average productivity3 so that (s) := f(s)  
f 0(s)  s  0.
In the same vein, we can also compute from lemma 1 the quantities of organic and conventional
seeds sold by each input provider. By rearranging equation (6) these quantities are given by:8<: s
j
o

co
k(n)
;m; n

= n
m
 so

co
k(n)
;m

sjc

cb
pc
;m; n

= (N n)
m
 sc

cb
pc
;m
 (9)
3This directly follows from the absence of "free lunch" (i.e f(0) = 0) and the concavity of f .
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and the prot of each seed provider is given by:
 (k(n); co; pc; cb;m; n) =
1
m2
0@ n  k(n)  h f"so  cok(n) ;mi  so  cok(n) ;m2
+(N   n)  pc 
h
 f"

sc

cb
pc
;m
i


sc

cb
pc
;m
2
1A (10)
Those results are, in some sense, usual. In fact, following Saitone, Sexton and Sexton (2008),
we observe that the introduction of imperfect competition among the upstream sellers in the seed
sector has important distributional impacts. Upstream market power (measured by the inverse of
the number m of input providers) classically reduces the amount of seeds used in both the organic
and the conventional sector (see lemma 2) with respect to a competitive situation. It also modies
the prots distribution because the input providers are able to capture a part of the prot of the
farm contrary to a pure competitive situation in which constant returns to scale typically reduce
their prot to zero. Of course, this e¤ect disappears when the number of input providers becomes
large. In that case, the quantities traded converge to the competitive outcome (see lemma 2) and
the prot of the input providers goes to zero (see equation 10).
4 The free entry equilibrium
We now move to the issue of the distribution of the di¤erent farmers between organic and conven-
tional activity and to the conditions that ensure the emergence of organic farming as a plausible
alternative to conventional agriculture. Moreover, this will give us the opportunity to assess, in
the next section, some public policy intervention that sustain the development of organic farming.
4.1 The free entry equilibrium distribution
We must rst dene an equilibrium concept in order to construct this distribution. Under free
entry, the equilibrium distribution of farmers between both sectors is reached if no farmer (ex-
pecting higher return) is willing to move to the other sector. The free entry condition is quite
simple to dene since the prot of the conventional farmer (see equation 8) is independent of the
number of organic farmers. This means that an equilibrium distribution is reached for a n with
the property that : (
o (k(n
); co;m)  c (pc; cb;m)
c (pc; cb;m)  o (k(n + 1); co;m)
(11)
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In this case, no organic farmer is willing to turn into a conventional one and reciprocally no
conventional farmer is willing to change his activity. If, for the sake of simplicity, we consider n as
a continuous variable, this means that we have to nd an n satisfying the following two properties:(
o (k(n
); co;m) = c (pc; cb;m)
o (k(n
); co;m) is decreasing at n:
(12)
If we want to study this equilibrium distribution, it becomes important to investigate the
behavior of the prot of organic farmers when n changes. By computing this partial derivative,
we obtain:
@o
@n
= k0(n) 
"
(s)jso( cok(n) ;m)

 
 
d
ds

so( cok(n) ;m)
!
 @so
@ (c0=k(n))
 co
k(n)
#
(13)
We also know that:
 (s)  0 since the marginal productivity is lower than the average one,
 by proposition 1, so

co
k(n)
;m

is decreasing with (c0=k(n)) and,
 by computation d
ds
=  f"(s)  s  0
We can therefore assert that the sign of @o
@n
is the same as the sign of k0(n). In other words, the
fact that o (k(n); co;m) is decreasing or not with n is essentially explained by the interaction of
the progressive learning process (n) and the constant erosion of the advantage due to the "niche"
market measured by p(n). If we now have in mind that the rst e¤ect has decreasing return with
the number of farmers who adopt organic farming, i.e. "(n) < 0; while the erosion of the niche
benets increases with the numbers of organic farmers, i.e. p0(n) < 0 and p"(n) < 0., we can
expect that:
Lemma 2 The prot function of an organic farmer is \-shaped in n. It is rst increasing because
of the gain from the learning process, then dominated by the losses induced by the erosion of the
price in the niche market. The learning e¤ect works up to a critical number nmax , while the
erosion of the price will dominate after that number.
This \-shaped prot function has several consequences on the emergence of organic farm-
ing. First, if, at the critical number nmax, this prot is lower than the returns obtained in the
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conventional sector, i.e.
o (k(nmax); co;m) < c (pc; cb;m) (14)
an organic farmer sector will never emerge. This situation occurs simply because the maximal
gain induced by the learning process never compensate the productivity losses specic to organic
farming. If condition 14 is not met, this nevertheless does not imply that organic farming occurs
for sure. Because of this \-shaped property, it may happen that the prot of the rst farmer
which moves to organic farming remain lower than the returns of conventional agriculture, i.e.
o (k(1); co;m) < c (pc; cb;m) (15)
In this case, we typically have two equilibrium distributions :
 one with both organic and conventional farming (or even only organic farming if o (k(N); co;m)
is greater than c (pc; cb;m)).
 one in which only conventional farming occurs simply because the rst mover to organic
farming, which benets from any learning e¤ect, is not able to compensate his productivity
losses by the additional gain induced by the "niche" market.
Finally if both conditions (14) and (15) are not satised we can expect that there exists a unique
distribution of the farmers between both sectors (or only organic farming if o (k(N); co;m) 
c (pc; cb;m)).
4.2 The emergence of organic farming under imperfect competition
In this subsection, we go a step further in the understanding of the emergence of organic farming
by identifying su¢ cient conditions that bring together the costs of the up-stream seed providers,
the prices for organic and conventional products and the learning by doing e¤ect.
Let us rst start with the simplest case in which the organic farming sector has no competitive
advantage with respect to the conventional one, i.e.
8n; co
p(n)(n)
>
cb
pc
(16)
One may typically expect that organic farming never occurs. The mechanism which leads to this
situation is however di¤erent from a competitive one and is driven by the equilibrium behavior of
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the up-stream imperfectly competitive rms. Since they are aware of this competitive advantage,
they a quantity strategy that favors conventional farmers. This follows directly from equation 7
and equations 2 3: under condition (16) and for any distribution n of the farmers between both
sector, they are willing to sell fewer seeds at a higher price to organic farmers. This immediately
reduces the prot opportunity of organic farming. Moreover, since we have assumed that co < cb,
equation 16 implies that 8n, p(n)(n) < pc, i.e. the combination of the learning-by-doing and the
"niche" market e¤ect never reaches the price level for conventional products. This last drawback
on the output market denitively relegates organic farming.
At contrario, is tempting to think that if the organic farmers have, for at least one distribution
n, a competitive advantage then organic farming is a potential outcome. This intuition, due to
imperfect competition, is again wrong. In this case, even if the up-stream seed providers now favor
the organic farmers by selling more seeds at a lower price, they also capture a larger part of their
prots (see equation 10 by having in mind that ef"(s) >  2). From that point of view, we have,
in our general setting4, to make sure the organic farmers can sell their products at a higher price
on the "niche market" and/or benets from the learning-by-doing e¤ect, i.e. 9n, p(n)(n)  pc.
In other words, we can say :
Proposition 2 Let nmax be dened as in lemma 2. Concerning the emergence of organic farming
we can say that:
(i) if maxn p(n)(n) 2
h
0; co
cb
 pc
h
organic farming never occurs,
(ii) if maxn p(n)(n) 2 ]pc;1[ there is always an equilibrium distribution of the farmers that
involves organic farming,
(iii) if none of these conditions is satised, organic farming occurs if and only if
o (k(nmax); co; nmax;m)  c (pc; cb;m)
Moreover, even if there exists a free entry equilibrium distribution that involves organic farmers
(case ii and iii), there may also be another equilibrium with only conventional farming simply
because there is no advantage for the rst mover to organic farming. To rule out this case, we
have to verify that o (k(1); co;m)  c

cb
pc
;m

.
The last remark of the previous proposition is linked to the fact that the prot of organic
farmers is \-shaped. If the last condition is not met, the development of organic farming can
4Since we work with a general production function we can only give su¢ cient condition. A more precise threshold
could be computed with a constant elasticity production function.
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therefore su¤er from a lack of coordination: a situation which has to be taken into account if a
policy maker wants to support organic farming. But, before we move to this issue, we rst present
some properties of our equilibrium.
4.3 Equilibrium with organic farming
Since we are primarily interested in organic farming, we henceforth assume that
o (k(nmax); co; nmax;m)  c (pc; cb;m)
in order to ensure there always exists a equilibrium that sustains organic farming; equilibrium can
be characterized by three main equations8>><>>:
(so) :=
1
m
 f"(so)  so + f 0(so) = cop(n)(n)
(sc) :=
1
m
 f"(sc)  sc + f 0(sc) = cbpc
p(n)  (n)  (so) = pc  (sc)
with (sc) = f(s)  f 0(s)s
The two rst equations summarize the optimal behavior of the providers (see equation 7) while
the last one directly follows from the entry condition. Moreover we also recall that  is decreasing
while  is increasing.
This gives us the opportunity to underscore several properties of an equilibrium with organic
farming. From the entry mechanism, we can obviously deduce that the prots will be the same
for each kind of farmer. But this last condition also gives us the opportunity to go a step further
in the characterization of an equilibrium. Let us rst remember that we have assumed that the
unit production cost of organic seeds is lower than the one of a bundle of seeds and chemical, i.e.
c0 < cb. We now assume that the price of conventional products is equal to the price of organic
food deated by the productivity loses, , i.e. pc = p(n)  (n). We immediately deduce from the
optimal behaviors of the providers that they sell more seeds to the organic farmers simply because
co
p(n)(n) <
cb
pc
and (s) is decreasing. But if we now add into the picture the fact that (s) is
increasing, we cannot be at a free-entry equilibrium since the prots of the organic farmers are
higher than those of the conventional ones. This induces entry, and contributes to a decrease of
p(n)  (n). We can therefore claim that at equilibrium the price of organic products deated
by the productivity loses, i.e. k(n) = p(n)  (n) is always lower than the one for conventional
products pc. By taking this result for granted, we can even deduce from the free entry condition
and the fact that (s) is increasing, that that each organic farmer uses, at equilibrium and on a
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same plots of land, more seed than conventional farmer, i.e. s0  sc: We can therefore state :
Proposition 3 At a free-entry equilibrium involving organic farming, we observe that:
(i) the price of organic products deated by the productivity loses is lower than the price for
conventional products i.e. p(n)  (n)  pc;
(ii) Organic farming requires more seed per plots of land i.e. so  sc
5 Public policy supporting the emergence of organic farm-
ing
As the main argument for support is of the "infant industry" type, we will focus here on the
impact of policy instruments on the level of the organic production, and on the distribution of
farms between two sectors. Using criteria like social welfare variation could be more appropriate
in a stationary regime, but would requires information on consumers surplus not accounted for in
our model. It is however well-known that, under imperfect competition some instruments could
prove to be ine¢ cient or even have perverse e¤ects. As a consequence we organize our discussion
in two steps: we rst present the main instruments and their basic e¤ects and in a second step we
discuss their global impact on our virtual agricultural sector.
5.1 The set of candidate instruments
First it may happen that the externalities induced by the combination of the "learning-by-doing"
process and the decreasing gain obtained from the "niche" market premium results in an equi-
librium precluding organic farming. This situation could occur even if organic farming is viable
simply because the prot of the rst mover to organic farming is lower than the prot of a con-
ventional farmer. There is, in other words, a coordination problem that bars organic farming.
This situation can nevertheless be overcome by improving the information on organic farming and
by developing extension services and farmer associations. The idea is to reduce the inhibition of
the rst mover and to motivate enough farmers to move together toward organic farming in order
to benet of a greater learning-by-doing e¤ect. We must nevertheless concede that the e¢ ciency
of this policy is typically inversely related to the size of the smallest coalition that will realize a
higher prot under organic farming i.e. made from the minimal number nmin of agents such that
o (k(nmin); co; nmin;m)  c (pc; cb;m) (17)
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If a coalition composed of nmin agents moves to organic farming, a natural entry mechanism
guarantees that an equilibrium with organic farming will be selected. That argument is typically
one of the type of "supporting infant industry".
As soon such an equilibrium occurs, a public agency can also decide to support organic farming
by using more standard instruments. We can for instance consider taxation on chemicals, a subsidy
for chemical free seeds, a subsidy for organic food production or eventually an improvement of the
learning curve. These di¤erent instruments can by easely introduced in our model:
 a tax per unit of chemical sold modies the unit production cost cb of the bundle by some 
(which of course takes into acount the proportion of chemicals in the bundle) since this tax
is indirectly paid by input providers.
 a subsidy  per unit of chemical-free seed bought by organic farmers reduces their cost. This
is measured by ps the price of organic seed (see equation 1). But inspecting equations (2)
and (4), this reduces the inverse demand function by  . As a consequence, this is formally
equivalent to reducing the unit production cost co by ,
 a subsidy  per unit of organic food provides a new return for organic farmers that can be
added to the price p(n) in equation (2)
 impacts of changes in the learning curve are more di¢ cult to capture: we simply state that
this curve shifts up by some  so that we replace (n) by (n) + 
By recalling equations (7) and (12) and by assuming that we look at a new equilibrium in the
neighborhood of a interior equilibrium distribution (i.e. n < N), the e¤ect of these policy
instruments can be measured by applying the implicit function theorem to:8>><>>:
(so) :=
1
m
 f"(so)  so + f 0(so) = co (n)
0(sc) := 1m  f"(sc)  sc + f 0(sc) = cb+pc
(n)  (so) = pc  (sc)
(18)
with (n; ; ) = (p(n) + )((n) + )
and we can show by computation that:
Proposition 4 If we consider an equilibrim in the neighborhood of an interior distribution of the
farmers between both sectors, we can summarize the e¤ect of the di¤erent policy instruments on
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the production level of the di¤erent types of farmers and on the equilibrium distribution between
both sectors in the following table:
Tax on chemi-
m icals (@)
Subs. for chemi-
cal free seeds (@)
Subs. for orga-
nic products (@)
Improving lear-
ning by doing (@)
Seeds used by an
organic farmer
(@s0)
  
0(sc)  (so)
D  0(sc)  (n; ; )
< 0   (so)
D  (n; ; )> 0 0 0
Bundles.used by a
conventional farmer
(@sc)
1
0(sc)  pc
< 0 0 0 0
Distribution of
the farmers
(@n)
0(sc)  0(so)
D  0(sc)  @n(n; ; )
> 0
0(so)
D  @n(n; ; )
> 0   (n) + 
@n(n; ; )
> 0   p(n) + 
@n(n; ; )
> 0
with D = [0(so)(so)  0(so)(so)] < 0
5.2 E¤ects of the di¤erent policy instruments
We rst examine a tax on chemicals. This instrument has a very indirect and contrasted e¤ect on
organic farming. Taxing chemicals increases the price of seeds/chemicals bundle by (see equation
1):
@pb
@
=
@
@
(pc  f 0(sc)) = pc  f"(sc)  @sc
@
> 0
since the non-competitive seeds providers simply try to maintain their margins. This reduces
the prots of the conventional farmers and provides incentives to move to organic farming. But
entry in the organic sector reduces the benets expected from this "niche" market and when
an equilibrium with organic farming occurs, this last e¤ect dominates the potential gain from
learning-by-doing. This means that even if the taxation of chemicals increases the number of
organic farmers (@n
@
> 0 in the previous table), it also contributes to decrease the prot of each
unit of production simply because the free-entry mechanism stops only as the prot in the two
sectors are the same.
Subsidies for chemical free seeds have a more clear-cut e¤ect on organic farming. If this subsidy
is paid to the organic farmers, the seeds providers will have an incentive to decrease their margin
on chemical-free seeds in order to sell more to each farmer and therefore capture a part of this
subsidy. This is why the price for organic seeds decreases by (see equation 1):
@po
@
=
@
@
((n; ; )  f 0(so))
=
@(n; ; )
@n
 @n
@
 f 0(so) + (n; ; )  f"(so)  @so
@
=
f(so)  f"(so)
 D < 0
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Since a remaining share is left to the organic farmers, this sector becomes more attractive and
entry occurs (@n
@
> 0 in the previous table) until this additional gain is eliminated. We therefore
end up with more organic farmers who earn the same prot as in the situation without subsidies.
This last point is essentially due to the fact that input providers do not change their strategy on
the conventional seed market since
@sc
@
= 0 and therefore
@pb
@
= 0
Even if some conventional farmers move to the organic sector and reduce the demand for conven-
tional seeds, these input providers will benet from the capture of the subsidy given to these new
organic farmers.
The two last instruments (subsidies for organic production or investments that improve the
learning-by-doing) have rather similar e¤ects that are mainly explained by the free entry assump-
tion and the existence of imperfect competition on the input markets. Adjustments that are in-
duced by such policies are quite simple : subsidies to organic production or investment in learning-
by-doing improve the protability of organic farming since (n; ; ) = (p(n) + )((n) + ) in-
creases. So if nothing else changes, this induces entry until (n; ; ) comes back to its initial level
in order to equalize prots in both sectors. This can of course be easily checked:
d(n; ; )
d
=
@(n; ; )
@n
 @n
@
+
@(n; ; )
@
=
@(n; ; )
@n
   ((n) + )
@n(n; ; )
+ (n) +  = 0
From that point of view, most of the public spending goes to the development of organic farming
since the input providers do not adjust their margin behavior in order to capture the additional
prot, contrary to the previous case. To understand why the input providers do not try to capture
a part of these subsidies, we revisit the basic equations that specify their behavior (equation 7).
We immediately observe that these rms do not adapt their behavior on the conventional seeds
market so that the prot of each of these farmers remains constant. For organic seeds, the story
is quite di¤erent since equation 7 says that
1
m
 f"(so)  so + f 0(so) = co
(n; ; )
This means that if no entry occurs, any increase of (n; ; ) due to additional subsidies increases
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the quantity of seeds sold to each farmer in order to capture a part of this subsidy. But when
entry occurs and when the distribution is close to an equilibrium with organic farming, we know
that (n; ; ) decreases so that the input providers have now an incentive do decrease so. This
mechanism works until the initial level of traded seeds is reached.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have examined the viability conditions of organic farming under an imperfect
competition. While most of the research dealing with the issue of organic farming has adopted
an empirical approach and focused on farmers and farms characteristics, we rely instead on a
theoretical approach. Our model is based on a set of six major assumptions : (i) the farmers
are homogenous in all respects, (ii) they are free to adopt conventional or organic farming (iii)
they face an oligopolistic seeds and chemical industry which provides both chemicals free seed or
a bundle of seed and pesticides (iiii) the existence of a niche market e¤ect (v) a learning-by-doing
process for organic farmers which partially compensates the technical gap between organic and
conventional technologies and (vi) pure competition on the market for conventional products.
By using free-entry conditions and backward solving of the game, we have been able to spell out
precise conditions for the emergence of organic farming. These conditions depend on the degree
of competition among the upstream rms, the cost of production of chemicals-free seeds and the
cost of production of the bundle of seeds and chemical for conventional production, and the prices
for both products. We then examined the impacts of several policy instruments to support the
emergence of organic production. They are motivated by environmental considerations and by
the desire to protect an "infant industry". We examined four plausible instruments and analysed
their impact on the level of production and on the distribution of farms between organic and
conventional production. We introduced a tax on the bundle of chemicals and seeds, a subsidy
for chemical free seeds, a subsidy to the organic production and support of the learning by doing
process. All the selected instruments increase the share of organic sector but have di¤erent impacts
on prots distribution .
Indeed, because most of the farmers in developped countries face concentrated agro-bussiness
rms, our results have some degree of generality. This general framework could be used to ex-
amine the conditions of emergence and of di¤usion of several innovations under imperfect compe-
tition. However, some assumptions are specic to the game theoretical approach. For instance,
we assumed that all the farmers are homogenous, and only motivated by the same goal, prot
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maximization. The choice of technology by farmers could be also driven by individual preferences.
Moreover, our approach has focused on the supply side, and does not explore the demand side in
much detail. Eventually this choice could be updated to account for a quickly growing demand
for organic products.
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APPENDIX
A The su¢ cient conditions for optimality
Let us observe that the Hessian matrix of the prot function is given by H =
"
A 0
0 B
#
with
8>><>>:
A = k(n) 

f (3)

1
n
Pm
j=1 s
j
o

 s
j
o
n2
+ (1 + 1n )  f (2)

1
n
Pm
j=1 s
j
o

B = pc 

f (3)

1
N n
Pm
j=1 s
j
c

 s
j
c
(N   n)2 +

1 + 1N n

 f (2)

1
N n
Pm
j=1 s
j
c

where f (n) stands for the nth derivative. Now remember that under market clearing the amount of seeds used by
an organic farmer is so = 1n
Pm
j=1 s
j
o, the same being true for conventional farming hence sc =
1
N n
Pm
j=1 s
j
c. If
we carry out this change of variables and introduce ef"(s) :=
f(3)(s)s
f(2)(s)
the elasticity of f", the previous Hessian
becomes:
H =
2664
k(n)
n
 f (2) (so)

ef"(s0)  s
j
o
n  s0 + 1 + n

0
0
pc
N   n  f
(2) (sc) 

ef"(sc)  s
j
c
(N   n)  sc + 1 +N   n

3775
If both diagonal terms are negative, H is negative denite. Since f (2) (s) < 0, it remains to check that8>><>>:
ef"(s0)  s
j
o
n  s0 + 1 + n > 0
ef"(sc)  s
j
c
(N   n)  sc + 1 +N   n > 0
(19)
This result is of course obvious when ef"(s)  0. So let us consider the case in which ef"(s) < 0. Now let us rst
observe that at an optimal strategy of a Cournot player markets always clear. We can therefore say that n  s0 and
(N   n) sc are the aggregated quantities of the two kinds of seeds that are supplied, so that s
j
o
n  s0 and
sjo
(N   n)  sc
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are market shares which belong by construction to [0; 1]. Moreover n and N   n are both greater than 1 otherwise
one sector would not be activated. Finally remember that we have assumed that ef"(s) >  2. If we make use of
the three remarks, it immediately follows that conditions (19) holds
B Proof of Lemma 1
Let us dene (s;m;K) := 1m  f"(s)  s+ f 0(s) K. It is easy to observe that:
@(s;m;K)
@s
=
1
m
 f (3)(s)  s+ f (2)(s) 

1 +
1
m

=
1
m
 f (2)(s)  (ef"(s) + 1 +m) < 0
since f (2)(s) < 0; ef"(s) >  2 and m  1. Moreover we notice that:
 lims!0 (s;m;K) = f 0(s)

1
m  ef 0(s)  Kf 0(s)

= +1 since lims!0 f 0(s) = +1 and ef 0(s) remains bounded.
 lims!+1 (s;m;K) =  K since lims!+1 f 0(s) = 0.
We can therefore state that there exists a unique solution in s (m;K) to (s;m;K) = 0 and the lemma is obtained
by applying the preceding argument to each equation of system (7)
C Proof of Proposition 1
Let us come back to the denition of (s;m;K) given in lemma 1. If we now apply the implicit function theorem,
we immediately observe that :
@s (m;K)
@m
=
1
m2  f"(s)
@(s;m;K)
@s
> 0 and
@s (m;K)
@K
=

@(s;m;K)
@s
 1
< 0
which proves the rst part of the proposition. Let us now push m to innite, the equation (s;m;K) = 0 simply
becomes f 0(s) K = 0 since ef 0(s) is bounded. Hence s = (f 0) 1 (K).
D Proof of Lemma 2
The proof of Lemma 2 is immediate. Remember that the sign

@o (k(n); co;m)
@n

= sign (k0(n)). So let us study
k(n) = p(n)  (n). By computation we obtain:
k0(n) = p0(n)  (n) + p(n)  0(n) (20)
k"(n) = p"(n)  (n) + 2  p0(n)  0(n) + p(n)  "(n) (21)
Now let us observe that:
 k"(n) < 0, since we have assumed that p0(n) < 0 and p"(n) < 0, 0(n) > 0 and "(n) < 0.
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 limn!0 k0(n) > 0 because limn!0 p0(n) = 0 and 0(n) > 0
 limn!N k0(n) < 0 because limn!N 0(n) = 0 and p0(n) < 0
We conclude that there exists a unique n0 verifying k0(n0) = 0, and therefore such that
@o (k(n0); co;m)
@n
= 0.
Moreover, since k"(n) < 0, o (k(n0); co;m) is \-shaped.
E Proof of Proposition 2
(i) Assume that maxn p(n)(n) < cocb  pc, This means that 8n, cop(n)(n) >
cb
pc
and we can deduce from Lemma
1 that 8n, so

co
k(n) ;m

< sc

cb
pc
;m

. If we now remember that (s) := (f(s)  f 0(s)  s) is increasing since
0(s) =  f"(s)  s, we can say that 8n, 

so

co
k(n) ;m

< 

sc

cb
pc
;m

. Now remember that co < cb, this
implies, in case (i), that 8n, p(n)(n) < pc. It remains to mix these two observations in order to say that:
8n; o (k(n); co;m) = p(n)  (n)  

so

co
k(n)
;m

< pc  

sc

cb
pc
;m

= c (pc; cb;m)
It is impossible to observe an equilibrium distribution which involves organic farming.
(ii) if maxn p(n)(n) 2 ]pc;1[ and since co < cb, we can say that 8n, cop(n)(n) < cbpc . With the same arguments
as in point (i) and by simply reversing the inequalities we can conclude that 8n; o (k(n); co;m) > c (pc; cb;m),
i.e. organic farming always dominates conventional agriculture.
(iii) if none of these conditions is satised, organic farming occurs if and only if o

co
k(nmax)
; nmax;m

 c

cb
pc
;m

because 0 is \-shaped with respect to n.
F Proof of Proposition 4
Let us recall that the outcome of our model can be reduced to three equations : the modied rst order conditions
of the input providers, i.e. equations (7) and the free entry condition, i.e. equation (12). These equation, after the
introduction of the di¤erent policy arguments are sumerized in equation (18). However to simpliy the notations
let us introduce (s) = 1m  f"(s)  s+ f 0(s), (s) = f(s)  f 0(s)  s and . (n; ; ) = (k(n) + (n) + p(n)) . We
can even notice that (i) 0(s) < 0 see lemma 1, (ii) 0(s) =  f"(s)  s > 0 and (iii) @n(n; ; ) < 0 by construction.
This last point requires an additional comment. In the comparative static excercice we are looking at what happen
in a neighborhood of an equilibrium wich has the property that n 2 ]0; N [ and that all policy argument are set to
0. So by construction at the equilibrium @n(n; ; ) < 0, and since we apply the Implicite Function Theorem (IFT)
from a local point of view, we can choose the neighborhoods such that @n(n; ; ) < 0 at the new equilibrium.
Now let build the function:
(so; sc; n;  ; ; s; ) =

(so)  co   
(n; ; )
, (sc)  cb + 
pc
; (n; ; )  (so)  pc(sc)

And since an equilibrium is given by (so; sc; n; ;  ; s) = 0, let us apply the IFT. By a simple exercice of compu-
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tation and by bearing in mind that (so) = co (n) ; we observe that :
@(so;sc;n) =
2664
0(so) 0
(so)@n(n;;)
(n;;)
0 0(sc) 0
(n; ; )  0(so)  pc  0(sc) @n(n; ; )  (so)
3775
and
@(;;;) =
2664
0 1(n;;))
(so)((n)+)
(n;;)
(so)(p(n)+)
(n;;)
  1pc 0 0 0
0 0 ((n) + )  (so) (p(n) + )  (so)
3775
Now let us observe that the determinant of @(so;sc;n) given by:
det
 
@(so;sc;n)

= 0(sc)  @n(n; ; ) 

0(so)(so)  0(so)(so)

< 0
Being non-zero, we can therefore apply the IFT and we know that @(;;)(so; sc; n) =  
 
@(so;sc;n)
 1  @(;;)
(at least locally). Moreover it is a matter of fact to check that:
 
@(so;sc;n)
 1
=
1
D
2664
(so)   pc
0(sc)(so)
(n;;)0(sc)  
(so)
(n;;)
0 D0(sc) 0
 0(so) (n;;)@n(n;;)
0(so)pc0(sc)
0(sc)@n(n;;)
0(so)
@n(n;;)
3775
with D =

0(so)(so)  0(so)(so)

< 0
We therefore obtain that:
@(;;;)(so; sc; n) =
1
D
2664
  0(sc)(so)(n;;)0(sc)  
(so)
(n;;) 0 0
D
0(sc)pc 0 0 0
0(so)0(sc)
0(sc)@n(n;;)
0(so)
@n(n;;)
  ((n)+)D@n(n;;)  
(p(n)+)D
@n(n;;)
3775
Since (s); 0(s); (s); (n) > 0 and 0(s); @n(n; ; ) < 0 at an equilibrium, we can conclude that:
sign

@(;;;)(so; sc; n)

=
2664
  + 0 0
  0 0 0
+ + + +
3775
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